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Approved For Release 2002/06/14 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100160033-0

IAD - 83/66
15 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Photographic Intelligence
FROM: Chief, Imagery Analysis Division, CIA
SUBJECT: The Impact of the JIIRG Report on IAD

1. Pursuant to your request we have reviewed the JIIRG Report and performed an assessment of its impact on IAD as follows:

a. Termination of Dual Hat Leadership - The tasking responsibilities embodied within this report appeared to rule out the two-hat concept of administration between IAD and NPIC. The elevation of IAD to a national community producer with increased departmental responsibilities and co-equal participation in committees of USIB, would seem to rule out management of 2 of the 3 national producers by the Director, NPIC.

b. PI Augmentation - We see within the tasking plan a requirement for additional PI personnel over that requested in the Program Call. This is far in excess of the allocations provided by JIIRG. If the proposals of JIIRG for basic exploitation are approved NPIC will be placed in the position of providing updated basic reports on a periodic basis. Our experience is that timeliness is the main ingredient of acceptable intelligence reporting and as substantiated by the JIIRG Survey few intelligence community members have a requirement for base reports. Further these reports will be, by design, nothing but target sheets. We also see a substantial role in checking the validity of many of the reports issued by DIAAP-1P. Relative to this, the manpower allocation methodology of the JIIRG is faulty, in conception, erroneous in fact and in need of a complete overhaul.

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c. Support Augmentation - Under the proposals in JIIRG, CIA/IAD will be required to build in-house much of the support presently rendered by NPIC. Under JIIRG, direct support will not be provided by NPIC but will, as in the case of DIAAP-1P, be provided in-house within the division. IAD can no longer accept 2nd priority support at the expense of the CIA analytical community.

d. Staff Augmentation - We will require considerable augmentation in Staff personnel in order to provide bodies to the various committees, coordination and liaison functions envisioned by JIIRG.

e. Increased Film Copy - IAD will require its own copies of D.P.s and D.N.s on all JCS and National collections as well as a division film library in which to store it. As we will be unable to depend upon NPIC on a priority basis in our direct support requirements and as we will be required to meet our basic requirements in a "timely manner", we will of necessity have to be guaranteed the availability of film for PI and lab use.

f. New Quarters - Personnel augmentations in PI, Staff and Support plus a film library, photo lab, etc., will require IAD to find more adequate housing than that presently provided within [redacted]

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2. As is obvious from the above, the overall impact upon the CIA is one of large increased expenditures of money and large augmentation of personnel and although some of this is a realized gain from the reduced responsibilities within NPIC, the majority of it is over and above previous planning options. We note for your information also that the resolution of what will constitute 1st and 2nd Phase clandestinely-procured photography may well result in an additional impact as severe as those cited above.

3. In the course of studying the various appendices of the JIIRG numerous questions must be raised and a number of courses of action result from statements contained within these appendices. Attached are some additional questions and comments raised during the course of study and [redacted] possibly of some interest to you in further deliberations.

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ATTACHMENT
As Stated

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1. COMEX

a. With regard to membership of COMEX we take exception to having representation from Army, Navy and Air Force. We feel their interests could be served by the DIA representative. We further feel that the Chairman of COMEX should be from CIA.

b. We cannot arrive at a valid reason for limiting the dissemination of direct interpretation studies (Appendix R, page 2).

c. Section 3 on page 2 of Appendix R could be interpreted as giving broad powers to COMEX in the area of direct or departmental support. We recognize that it is not the papers intent to do so, therefore, we recommend that this paragraph be rewritten to clarify the role of COMEX so that it is explicate that they do not interfere with departmental tasking. Paragraph 4 of this same section gives them the power to manage the national data base. This was not the intent of JIIRG according to the briefing given by [redacted]. What are the implications or restrictions with regard to equipment requested to serve a strictly departmental function? Can IAD pursue the development of equipment that it and it alone feels is necessary for the fulfillment of its mission? By what methodology or based on what experience will COMEX be able to determine the interpreter proficiency requirements and exploitation techniques required by oncoming systems? This appears to be strictly an internal problem and one that might well vary from shop to shop depending on the type of work you are performing. IAD has always had the right to make these decisions in the past and feels that in order for any organization to properly fulfill its mission it must make these decisions in the future. The growth and recognition of IAD and the NPIC has largely been due to new concepts, new ideas, new techniques and the ability to develop these techniques without external interference.

d. In section 6, page 7, three subcommittees are established and their responsibilities outlined. Due to the nature of these subcommittees and the influence that they will have on day-to-day operations we feel that each of the three national PI shops have membership on these subcommittees and that this section be rewritten to so state.

2. National Tasking Plan

a. In reviewing the tasking options and in turn the tasking plan we find several areas in which we are in basic disagreement. In the first instance tasking options were not carried out to determine that they do indeed save the U. S. Government either manpower or money. This is our

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2. National Tasking Plan (continued)

understanding as the reason the study was undertaken. Apparently this has been sidetracked somewhere along the way and been replaced by a "how do we split the pie and make everyone happy" philosophy. I say this because I do not honestly feel that the original intent has been served and that the documents reviewed prove this and statements made in the briefing substantiate it.

b. Tasking under Option II does not recognize the delineation of responsibility as contained in NSCID No. 3, paragraphs 7b and 7c. This clearly states and I quote, "CIA shall produce economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and Scientific and Technical Intelligence as a service of common concern".

In spite of this, large segments of both economic and S&T functions are not assigned to CIA. In the economic area it was split three ways with the CIA receiving the lowest priority targets. Since many of your economic targets cannot be clearly defined as to category would it not make better sense and be more in line with statements in the JIIRG Report, "that target assignments are clearly defined" to group economic into one area of responsibility and assigned to one organization. In the case of non-military logistical and urban they simply do not exist under the definitions furnished in the appendices or in the manpower allocations in Appendix N. Who are we kidding?

c. In Appendix L, paragraph 6, page 27, concerning Option II, the statement is made and I quote, "Provides a reasonably practical alternative to a complete restructuring of the NPIC or the departmental imagery interpretation organizations as would be required under Option I and, to a lesser extent, under Option III". Is this true? Are not NPIC and the departmental shops presently structured to operate under Option I? Is it not true that DIAAP-1 will have to undergo major changes in order to operate under Option II. Isn't perhaps the major change that would take place under Option I a switch of manpower resources between DIAXX and DIAAP? Or would it be necessary to do away with DIAXX under Option I in order to allow a responsive reallocation of manpower as is done in CIA? Why is it so necessary to frequently use non-factual statements to support the recommendations if indeed the recommendations are the best.

d. Why is it that IAD can no longer publish reports? DIA and others have expressed a keen interest in and have requested and received our reports. Apparently there was a reason for this and apparently our views were worthy of consideration. Now the JIIRG has taken upon itself to tell the analysts of the community that they shall

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2. National Tasking Plan (continued)

not receive these reports regardless of whether or not the need exists or it is desired to have our view. How does this reduce duplication? Is Langley going to buy at face value reports produced by DIA, NRTSC or FTD? They haven't in the past, why should they now? The elimination of publication of reports in response to direct tasking will create more duplication of effort than now exists. Further it places a restriction on the DCI to manage CIA as he sees fit. We recommend that before any papers are signed that this be rewritten and that the decision to publish reports will be left to the head of the respective Agency.

e. On page 23 of Appendix M, paragraph J, the power is given to COMEX to levy first and second phase requirements on any of the direct support elements in response to national or departmental needs. Does this not conflict with the concept that direct support elements are responsive and under the control of the Agency heads?

f. On page 25 of Appendix M, non-military logistics is assigned to CIA. The definition given here conflicts with definitions of military logistics in other appendices and is completely ignored in the allocation of manpower. Although urban studies are listed on the chart they are not listed here. It is our opinion that a need does exist for logistical studies and that a delineation can be made. We recommend that military logistics be those roads, rail, inland waterways, pipelines and ports in an active combat area and that non-military logistics be those road, rail, inland waterways, pipelines and ports in non-combat areas.

g. On page 27 of Appendix M it states that CIA cannot perform direct support in targeting or BDA. Why this restriction? What if we are called upon to perform targeting as we are presently doing for DD/P. What if CIA is called upon to do an independent analysis of the effect the bombing in SE Asia is having on the economy? Does this mean that IAD cannot furnish the support they desire? We recommend that this restriction be removed.

h. Why are JCS-sponsored penetration missions not considered national in the same light as other penetration missions?

i. Why, since we have established three national PI shops to do basic reporting, is it stated that NPIC may be tasked under direct tasking to furnish a national view? Do we or don't we have a national view in what is done under the basic studies by CIA and DIA? As far as

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2. National Tasking Plan (continued)

supplemental view, which is another reason for direct tasking of NPIC, might not already exist in the unpublished reports of the departmental PI shops? Might this not increase duplication of effort? If departmental PI shops were allowed to publish, the supplemental view might already exist.

j. On page 26, paragraph 4, Military Departments

Tasked within this paragraph are the S&T organizations of the Military Departments for certain critical categories of reporting, yet on page 10, paragraph 2 it states these organizations cannot be tasked -- only requested and they will perform these duties only if it does not interfere with their primary mission. It is interesting to note that though these organizations (FTD, NRTSC and AIIC) share the National plum. They are untouchable and unaccountable to COMEX in terms of levies and manpower resource allocations. Why?

k. Page 19, paragraph 3 of Appendix M

It is not clear why DIA is assigned control of effecting an integrated worldwide imagery exploitation system. The concepts of National reporting already outlined are justified on the basis of needs transcending the DOD or any other organization. Recommend OPIC's and broader concept be a responsibility of COMEX.

l. Under "Concepts", paragraph c, page 15 of Appendix M, a statement is made concerning the legislating of a confidence factor on each of the PI producers. Our experience dictates that CIA analysts will not, if they are properly accomplishing intelligence analysis, buy by rote what DIA produces in their area of responsibility.

m. It will be mandatory that IAD be provided with film on a timely basis if it is to perform its assigned functions. This will mean more duplication of film at added expense.

n. We do not share the urgency expressed here for the preparation of PI Keys nor do we desire to participate in their preparation.

o. There is no provision for IAD to pursue R&D programs in response to field PI needs. It will therefore be necessary for IAD to develop its own R&D effort at additional expense. We will also be forced to develop our own support elements in all areas wherein we have received support from NPIC. Can we assume then that those personnel identified in JIIRG Report as supporting NPIC, will be transferred to IAD?

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3. Allocations

a. We seriously object to the statement on page 13 that the resource allocations be accepted for FY 67 and FY 68. Our objections are based on the methodology upon which these figures were determined.

b. The assumption that 1352 manhours represents a productive manyear is erroneous. We have data far in excess of what was requested by the JIIRG, going back several years, to prove the validity of 1290 manhour manyear. To accept the 1352 figure would force us to curtail many of the activities that have made the IAD PI the best in the business.

c. We seriously object to the use of a graph and figures to show a saving of manpower over the next five years because it gives a completely erroneous impression and compares apples with oranges. This graph is supposed to show savings, yet the figures IAD and NPIC furnished JIIRG included supervisory personnel; the JIIRG figures did not. Secondly, it is stated on page 42 of Appendix N that not enough empirical data was available to apply the JIIRG methodology for direct support exploitation. In one instance we cannot use IAD methodology for computing manpower and must adopt a JIIRG method because it is supposedly applicable to all three phases of exploitation and now we are told their method cannot be applied to direct support, IAD's major role. The methodology employed assumed that IAD with a bare [] PIs is currently performing all the direct support required. This is wrong. It next stated that the introduction of basic reporting would decrease the need for direct support. There is no research to support this. The JIIRG survey of PI products users generally did not use basic reports, preferring the more timely and analyst-oriented direct exploitation reports. It is much more logical to assume that with the elimination of dissemination of direct support reports, the requirements will increase. In discussions with the JIIRG members who prepared this section, it was clear from their comments that there was little or no factual data employed to compute manpower figures for direct support.

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In summation the graphs and figures used to show manpower economics are not based upon factual data and do not compare comparative figures.

d. The original purpose of this report was to present an economical way for the U.S. Government to get the job done. One of the major expenditures of manpower has been and will continue to be in areas of support to the PI. Does this method, Option II, save or cost us more? You cannot find the answer. Cite: Appendix L, pages 2 and 44.

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3. Allocations (continued)

e. We recommend that Appendix N be rewritten to properly reflect the manpower needs of the various PI organizations. After spending the time and effort to prepare this report and considering the impact it will have on the intelligence community we can ill afford to have it misrepresent the facts.

4. Summary

a. In summation we feel that the report should not be signed in its present form. Whether or not Option II is the decided course we are to follow, there is much in the report that is erroneous and should be corrected before being implemented. Once signed, it will be extremely difficult if not possible to correct.

In reviewing the terms of reference in Appendix A, we find several instances where the report has not responded to the task. The report does not contain the factual data to support the recommendations as stated in paragraph D, page 2. Namely the three options were not pursued to determine which was the most economical, support costs have not been determined under either option, and direct support costs are based on guesses rather than fact.

Sub-paragraph (2) on page 2 states a need to determine unwarranted overlap and duplication. This was never clearly determined and in fact, the restrictions on publishing direct support reports will only increase duplication.

Sub-paragraph (3) on the same page requests an evaluation of resources. This has not been accomplished. How many additional lab, editors, graphics, etc., personnel will NPIC need? Where is it stated that IAD will now require lab, graphics, and collateral support personnel? What is the cost of setting up a new lab and film storage facilities for IAD?

Does the increased duplication that will arise from the elimination of direct support publication satisfy sub-paragraph 4 on page 27

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